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THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS: LEWIS CREATES
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
By
Meghan M. Gonyea*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the United States Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333 (2011) (“Concepcion”) validated adhesive arbitration agreements. 1
Concepcion held that California’s Discover Bank rule, which attempted to ban class action
waivers in most consumer contracts, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”). 2 While the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly upheld class action waivers in the
consumer context, this decision left considerable room for the lower courts to interpret
class action waivers found in employment agreements.3
The National Labor Relations Board (“Board”), empowered by the National Labor
Relations Act 4 (“NLRA”), decided D.R. Horton Inc. and Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B.
2277 (2012)5 (“Michael Cuda”), and found that employers who banned class action claims
in both arbitral and judicial forums violated the NLRA because class actions were
“concerted activity,” and thus protected by the statute.6 This victory for employees was
short-lived, after the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce Michael Cuda on appeal, because the
Board’s decision “did not give proper weight to the Federal Arbitration Act.” 7 Only a
couple of years later, the Seventh Circuit decided Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d
1147 (7th Cir. 2016),8 creating a split in authority among the circuit courts that will now
be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in the October 2017 Term.9
*
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See generally AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).

2

See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (Cal. 2005).

3

See generally Concepcion 563 U.S. at 352.

4

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).

5

See D.R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).

See Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2288 (discussing “concerted activity” as “employees’ ability to join
together to pursue workplace grievances, including through litigation.”).
6

7

D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013).

8

See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).

9

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/epic-systemscorp-v-lewis/.

In Lewis, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to support the Board’s
interpretation that the NLRA precludes class action waivers. 10 The Seventh Circuit
reconciled the NLRA and FAA, finding no conflict between the two federal statutes
because the NLRA and FAA “work[ed] hand in glove.”11 The Seventh Circuit’s decision
will soon undergo review by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the relationship between
the NLRA and the FAA, and further, to settle the validity of class action waivers in
employment agreements.12
This article will first provide background information regarding class action
waivers in both the consumer and employment context. Next, this article will discuss the
NLRA and how the Board attempted to interpret the federal statute as precluding class
arbitration waivers. This discussion will then provide an overview of the circuit split
created by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lewis. Finally, this article will discuss the
potential implications of the Lewis decision, and suggest how the decision created a
framework for the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate class action waivers in employment
agreements. This article will highlight the current landscape of the U.S. Supreme Court
after the 2016 presidential election, and the potential influence of that landscape on the
outcome of class action waivers in employment agreements.
II.

U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT GOVERNING CLASS ACTION WAIVERS

In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court “revolutionized” arbitration in the labor
context by deciding the “Steelworkers Trilogy.” 13 The Steelworkers Trilogy cases
encouraged the practice of arbitration to resolve labor disputes, and also directed courts to
limit any merits review of arbitral disputes.14 Further, in the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court
exercised deference to arbitration clauses found within employee collective bargaining
agreements.15 Businesses soon “seized on the judicial approval of statutory claims” and
began placing adhesive arbitration provisions in both consumer and employment
contracts. 16 The disadvantages of these agreements for both consumers and employees

10

See Lewis 823 F.3d at 1151.

11

Id. at 1157.

12

SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 9.

13

See Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV.
1682, 1682 (2014).
14

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
15

See generally Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
16

Hodges, supra note 13, at 1682-83.

include (1) the deprivation of jury trials; (2) limited discovery and available damages; and
(3) a limited, or even no ability to bring class action suits.17
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a recent trilogy of arbitration cases, continued to strip
away the rights of consumers and employees who are forced into agreements to arbitrate.18
This recent trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases did not address class action waivers in
employment agreements, but each decision interpreted the FAA, and such precedent “has
been interpreted to cover arbitration agreements in the employment setting.”19 While the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration is undeniable, the value of collective actions, in
particular for consumers and employees, cannot be overlooked. The Seventh Circuit’s
Lewis decision, along with proposed rules by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”), represent a fundamental shift in the future validity of class action waivers in
adhesive arbitration agreements.
To further understand the U.S. Supreme Court’s hostility toward class actions in
the arbitral context, an analysis of Concepcion provides insight.20 First, the Court was
concerned with the “structural” issues surrounding class-wide arbitration.21 Next, the Court
stated that class arbitration made the arbitral process “slower, more costly, and more likely
to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”22 The Court also noted that Congress
did not envision class arbitration when the FAA was passed in 1925.23 The Court continued
its analysis by generally providing that “class arbitration greatly increases risks to
defendants,” and “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”24

17

Hodges, supra note 13, at 1683.

18

See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (noting that
Concepcion resolved the case at issue, and further that class arbitration interfered with the fundamental
attributes of arbitration); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (holding that the FAA preempted a California rule that
attempted to ban class action waivers in adhesive consumer contracts); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (holding that an arbitration panel exceeded its powers by concluding
that the arbitration clause allowed for class arbitration).
See Hodges, supra note 13, at 1689 (summarizing the holdings of these three Supreme Court cases: “(1)
class arbitration cannot be ordered where an arbitration agreement does not explicitly provide for it; (2) a
California rule that invalidated most class action waivers in arbitration agreements as unconscionable was
preempted by the FAA; and (3) a class action waiver is enforceable even if an individual claim would cost
more to litigate than is available in damages, rejecting the argument that the arbitration agreement denied
affective vindication of the statutory claim.”).
19

20

See generally Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347-51.

21

See id. at 347-48 (stating several concerns, including (1) the fact that class arbitration includes absent
parties, (2) confidentiality becomes more difficult, and (3) arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the
procedural aspects of certification).
22

Id. at 348.

23

See id. at 349.

24

Id. at 350.

Thus, even though the U.S. Supreme Court has defined arbitration as a “mere form
of trial,”25 it is yet unwilling to give parties to arbitration the same ability to bring claims
collectively in the arbitral forum.26 Without considering the advantages of class arbitration
for consumers and employees who are forced into arbitration through adhesion, the U.S.
Supreme Court engaged in a one-sided argument, which, as a result, has limited the rights
of many individuals to act collectively.27
The four Justices who dissented in the Concepcion decision attacked several of the
majority’s arguments. The dissenters recognized the generalizations made by the majority
and exposed the lack of evidence used for support.28 The dissenting opinion, written by
Justice Breyer, and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, argued that the
Discover Bank rule was consistent with the FAA’s language. 29 Next, the dissent
emphasized that Congress’ primary objective in enacting the FAA was not solely to
guarantee the procedural advantages of arbitration.30 The dissent emphasized the Discover
Bank rule’s efforts to “[do] just what § 2 requires, namely, put[] agreements to arbitrate
and agreements to litigate ‘upon the same footing.’”31
The dissent continued by invalidating the majority’s opinion that the Discover Bank
rule increased the complexity of arbitration procedures. 32 The dissent criticized the
majority’s comparison of class arbitration with that of bilateral arbitration, stating the
correct comparison, if anything, was between class arbitration and judicial class actions.33
The dissent also recognized that no “rational lawyer” would have signed on to represent
the Concepcions for the possibilities of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim.34 Finally, the
dissent criticized the lack of any “meaningful support for [the Court’s] views in [the]

25

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989).

26

See generally Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.

27

See id.

28

See id. at 360-61.

29

Id. at 359 (noting in addition that the Discover Bank rule was consistent with the purpose behind the FAA,
in that the purpose was to “make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration”).
Id. at 359-60 (explaining that the primary objective was to secure the “enforcement” of agreements to
arbitrate).
30
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Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 361.

32

Id. at 363-65 (noting that class arbitration was consistent with the use of arbitration, and further, that class
arbitration was well known in California and followed elsewhere).
33

Id. at 363 (emphasizing that California applied the same legal principles to address the unconscionability
of class arbitration waivers as it did to address the unconscionability of any other contractual provision).
Id. at 365 (agreeing with California’s “perfectly rational view” that nonclass arbitration over such sums
would sometimes have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims).
34

Court’s precedent.” 35 The dissent cited precedent that authorized complex arbitration
procedures, upheld nondiscriminatory state laws that slowed down arbitration proceedings,
and found no precedent “strik[ing] down a statute that treat[ed] arbitrations on par with
judicial and administrative proceedings.”36
Concepcion’s dissenting Justices carefully and meticulously stripped down the
majority’s opinion, recognizing the lack of support and empirical evidence provided by
Justice Scalia, the author of the opinion. Thus, although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet
to weigh in on the use of class action waivers in the employment context, the 5-4 split in
Concepcion reveals strong ideological differences among the Justices. With the passing of
Justice Scalia, the largely unsettled issue of class action waivers in U.S. arbitration law will
be at the mercy of the newly confirmed Justice, Neil Gorsuch.
III.

THE VALUE OF CLASS ACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES AND THE PURPOSE OF THE NLRA

The ability to bring a class action among low-wage workers is particularly
important because these individuals often have “legitimate claims with low, individual
value.”37 A class action “is a procedural device that permits one or more plaintiffs to file
and prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a larger group, or ‘class.’”38 Section 7 of the NLRA
seeks to protect such workers by equalizing the bargaining power between employees and
employers by granting the right to collective bargaining. 39 This section will explore why
class actions are so important for low-wage employees, the efforts of the NLRA to protect
such rights, and how the U.S. Supreme Court has restricted these rights by weakening
exceptions to the FAA.
A. The Need for Class Action Rights Among Low-Wage Employees
The rights of low-wage workers are frequently violated, and low-wage workers
particularly struggle to bring individual claims against employers for several reasons.40
These reasons include, but are not limited to, the costs of litigation, a lack of financial

35

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 366.

36

Id.

Nicole Wredberg, Note, Subverting Workers’ Rights: Class Action Waivers and the Arbitral Threat to the
NLRA, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 885 (2016).
37

Class Action, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/class_action (“Put
simply, the device allows courts to manage lawsuits that would otherwise be unmanageable if each class
member . . . were required to be joined in the lawsuit as a named plaintiff.”).
38

39

See 29 U.S.C. § 157.

40

See Wredberg, supra note 37, at 885.

resources, and fear of retaliation from employers.41 Because class actions are threatening
to employers, arbitration agreements increasingly and strategically are drafted to include
class and collective action waivers.42 Low-wage employees, who often do not have the
financial capacity to reject an opportunity to work, are forced to enter into adhesive
arbitration agreements. Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion of Concepcion, noted that
“class arbitration greatly increase[ed] risks to defendants.”43 However, a more accurate
statement would be “that class arbitration levels the playing field in agreements that have
historically left plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage.”44 Both courts and legal scholars
have recognized that adhesive arbitration agreements are advantageous to defendants such
as AT&T Mobility because (1) consumers often do not understand or pay attention to the
wording of an arbitration provision; (2) the consumer has little bargaining power even if
the individual knows the consequences of an adhesive arbitration provision; and (3)
individual arbitration is not practical for consumers with small-value claims.45 Companies
and employers alike have placed class action waivers in adhesive arbitration provisions
with knowledge of these disadvantages. However, in the employment arena, NLRA
Section 7 provides a potential defense to employees who want to aggregate claims.46 The
U.S. Supreme Court will have to decide whether NLRA Section 7 can be reconciled with
the overwhelming enforcement of arbitration agreements.47

41

Id.

See Hodges, supra note 13, at 1687-88 (explaining, “Class actions are the legal bane of businesses. They
enable large groups of consumers or employees to band together to sue the employer in one action. They are
particularly useful for cases where each plaintiff has a small claim that would cost more to litigate than the
claim is worth. Litigating as a group makes it cost-effective to bring the case. Thus, the ability to bring a
class action may increase the business’s vulnerability to legal claims. Additionally, class actions are costly
and time-consuming to litigate. They often attract media attention and accordingly may affect a company’s
reputation. As a result, there is considerable pressure on companies to settle such claims when they are
filed.”).
42
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Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.
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Peter Danysh, Comment, Employing the Right Test: The Importance of Restricting AT&T v. Concepcion
to Consumer Adhesion Contracts, 50 HOUS. L.REV. 1433, 1449 (2013).
45

Id. at 1149-50.
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See generally 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 9.

B. Section 7 of the NLRA
Section 7 of the NLRA seeks to equalize the bargaining power between employers
and employees by bestowing the rights to bargain collectively. 48 Section 7 of the NLRA
reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a)(3).49
In summary, Section 7 of the NLRA permits employees to engage collectively
against more powerful employers.50 Circuit courts have struggled to reconcile the strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration with federal employment statutes like the NLRA.51
There are two general statutory exceptions to the strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration.52 The first exception, also known as the “savings clause” exception, can be
found in the final sentence of Section 2 of the FAA, and reads “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 53 The “savings clause” of the
FAA, also referred to as Section 2, reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
48

See generally 29 U.S.C. § 157.

49

29 U.S.C. § 157.

50

See id.

51

See generally Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157 (reconciling the FAA with the NLRA); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB,
737 F.3d at 357 (refusing to reconcile the FAA and NLRA and rejecting the NLRB’s interpretation of the
NLRA as precluding class action waivers); Morris v. Ernst & Young, 834 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2016)
(concluding the arbitration clause at issue interfered with the NLRA’s Section 7 right to concerted activity
and therefore could not be enforced); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 296-97 (2d Cir. 2013)
(concluding the Fair Labor Standards Act “FLSA” did not have a “contrary congressional command”
sufficient to override the FAA); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding the
FLSA lacked a “contrary congressional command” sufficient to override the mandate of the FAA).
52

Wredberg, supra note 37, at 899-900.

53

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

transaction, or refusal shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.54
The second exception exists where another statute conflicts with the FAA and
provides a “clear congressional command” to override the FAA. 55 The “effectivevindication” doctrine, created by the courts, is a method to ensure that arbitration is an
“effective mechanism” for vindicating federal statutory rights. 56 The necessity of the
effective-vindication doctrine was reinforced by a fiery dissent from Justice Kagan in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) 57 (“Italian
Colors”). Justice Kagan noted the majority’s disregard of the effective vindication
exception, and emphasized that “an arbitration clause may not thwart federal law,
irrespective of exactly how it does so.”58 However, although these remedies do exist to
combat the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court has
illustrated its willingness to enforce arbitration agreements despite the potential for
unfairness among aggrieved parties.59
As a result, several circuit courts have struggled to reconcile the FAA with other
statutory rights proscribed in federal employment statutes. The Seventh Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit created a circuit split by supporting the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA
as precluding class action waivers, and both opinions attempted to reconcile two very
powerful federal statutes, the FAA and the NLRA.60 Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit, on the
other side of the split, held that the NLRA did not contain a “contrary congressional
command” exempting the statute from application of the NLRA.61

54

9 U.S.C. § 2.

55

Wredberg, supra note 37, at 900.

56

Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective Vindication Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration
Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 375 (2014) (noting the Supreme Court’s decision in Italian Colors
“severely restricted the availability of the doctrine”).
57

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).

58

Id. at 2313.

59

See generally id. at 2312; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346-52.

60

See Morris, 834 F.3d at 985; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.

61

D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d at 362 (refusing to reconcile the two federal statutes and emphasizing
the superiority of the FAA).

IV.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF THE BOARD
A. The Michael Cuda Decision and the Fifth Circuit’s Reversal

In January of 2012, the Board published an opinion in an effort to reconcile the
FAA and the NLRA.62 In Michael Cuda, a homebuilder began to require each new and
current employee to execute a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” (“MAA”) as a condition
of employment. 63 Application and enforcement of the MAA waived the rights of
employees to proceed in a class or collective action because the agreement required that all
employment-related disputes were to be resolved through individual arbitration.64
The Board found in favor of the employee, while asserting several ideas throughout
the opinion that would prove to be controversial.65 The Board stated Section 7 of the NLRA
was a “substantive right.”66 The “substantive right” of NLRA Section 7 “lies at the heart
of the restructuring of employer/employee relationships that Congress meant to achieve in
the statute.” 67 Most controversially, Michael Cuda established a three-prong analysis,
ultimately concluding there was no conflict between the FAA and NLRA under the
circumstances of the case at hand.68 First, the Board stated the purpose of the FAA was to
prevent courts from treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other private
contracts, and therefore, “[t]o find that an arbitration agreement must yield to the NLRA is
to treat it no worse than any other private contract that conflicts with Federal Labor Law.”69
Second, the Board cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent that an agreement to arbitrate
federal statutory claims, including employment claims, may not require a party to lose the
substantive rights afforded by such statute.70 Third, the Board noted that nothing in the text
of the FAA suggested that an arbitration agreement inconsistent with the NLRA is
“nevertheless enforceable.”71
62

See Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2285.

63

Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2277.

64

Id. at 2277.

65

See id. at 2280-88.

66

Id. at 2278.

67

Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160 (emphasizing that the right to collective action under NLRA Section 7 is not
merely a procedural one).
68

Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2285-88.

69

Id. at 2285.

70

Id. (citing Gilmer v. Johnson/Interstate Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).

71

Id. at 2287.

The Board’s interpretation of the NLRA as precluding class action waivers was
short-lived after the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Board’s opinion.72 The Fifth Circuit, in
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013) (“D.R. Horton, Inc. v.
NLRB”), rejected the Board’s reconciliation of the FAA and the NLRA and granted
significantly more weight to the FAA.73 The Fifth Circuit first stated the use of class action
procedures was not a “substantive right,” and continued its analysis by citing Concepcion,
ultimately concluding that the Board’s rule did not fit within the savings clause of the
FAA.74 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the “contrary congressional command” exception to
the FAA.75
Two additional circuit courts have analyzed the issue of class action waivers in
employment agreements.76 The Eighth Circuit, in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d
1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Bristol Care”), directly rejected the plaintiff’s request to follow the
Board’s rationale in Michael Cuda, and held that arbitration agreements containing class
waivers were enforceable in claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”).77 The Second Circuit, in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2nd
Cir. 2013) (“Sutherland”), addressed the issue of whether an employee could invalidate a
class action waiver provision in the arbitration agreement when that waiver removed the
financial incentive for her to pursue a claim under the FLSA.78 The Second Circuit began
its analysis by citing the liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration,79 and swiftly rejected
the “contrary congressional command” and “effective vindication” exceptions to the
FAA.80

72

See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d at 348.

73

See id. at 357.

74

D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d at 359.

75

Id. at 360.

76

See generally Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.,
702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
77

Bristol Care, 702 F.3d at 1055 (emphasizing the absence of any contrary congressional command from the
FLSA that a right to engage in class actions overrides the mandate of the FAA in favor of arbitration).
78

Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 292.

79

Id. at 296.

80

Id. at 296-98 (citing Italian Colors, which held the effective vindication doctrine could not be used to
invalidate class-action waiver provisions in circumstances where the recovery sought is exceeded by the costs
of individual arbitration).

B. The Lewis Decision and Reasoning
In a recent decision out of the Seventh Circuit, the court in Lewis became the first
federal circuit court of appeals to support the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA as
precluding class arbitration waivers.81 Lewis simultaneously provided a framework for the
U.S. Supreme Court to decide once and for all the validity of class action waivers in the
employment context.82 The underlying dispute in Lewis involved an email sent by Epic
Systems to some of its employees. 83 The email contained an arbitration agreement
mandating that wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through individual arbitration
and that employees waived “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief
from any class, collective, or representative proceeding.”84
The court first established that filing a collective or class action suit constituted
“concerted activit[y]” under Section 7 of the NLRA.85 Next, the court cited the important
policy implications favoring the right of employees to engage in collective or class action
suits.86 The Seventh Circuit most importantly provided a thorough analysis reconciling the
NLRA with the FAA. 87 The Seventh Circuit refused to follow the precedent of other
circuits, and rather than allow the FAA to override the NLRA, the court in Lewis
emphasized, “[B]efore we rush to decide whether one statute eclipses another, we must
stop to see if the two statutes conflict at all.”88
The Seventh Circuit, unlike court opinions before Lewis, fluidly reconciled the
FAA and the NLRA, even going as far to state the two federal statutes worked “hand in
glove.”89 The Seventh Circuit directly attacked the Fifth Circuit’s decision in D.R. Horton,
Inc. v. NLRB, noting the logic of the Fifth Circuit’s decision had “several problems.”90 The
81

See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1159.

82

Id. at 1157-59 (concluding the employment agreement in question violated the NLRA and was
unenforceable under the FAA).
83

Id. at 1151.

84

Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151.

85

Id. at 1152.

Id. at 1153 (stating “Collective, representative, and class legal remedies allow employees to band together
and thereby equalize bargaining power.”).
86

87

Id. at 1157.

See id. at 1156 (emphasizing that a conclusion in which the FAA trumps the NLRA “puts the cart before
the horse.”).
88

89

90

Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.

Id. at 1158 (diminishing the logic of D.R. Horton II because the Fifth Circuit (1) relied on dicta of Supreme
Court precedent, (2) made no effort to harmonize the FAA and NLRA, and (3) failed to note that the NLRA
is in fact pro-arbitration.).

Seventh Circuit gave “equal footing” to the FAA and the NLRA.91 The Seventh Circuit’s
final point established that the right to collective action in Section 7 was a substantive right,
not a procedural one.92 On September 2, 2016, Epic Systems Corporation filed a writ of
certiorari, and on January 13, 2017, the petition was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court.93
Lewis was consolidated with Morris and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013
(5th Cir. 2015), and will be argued in front of the Supreme Court in the October 2017
Term.94
C. The Author of the Lewis Decision: Judge Diane P. Wood
The Lewis opinion was carefully drafted, and seamlessly reconciled the NLRA with
the FAA, a solution that circuit courts had been previously unwilling to apply. The author
of the Lewis decision, Judge Diane P. Wood, cannot be overlooked. Judge Wood is a
highly respected judge among her peers in the legal profession.95 Judge Wood has played
the role “of philosophical outlier, a left-leaning woman in a world of right-leaning men,”96
including Judge Posner and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook. Judge Wood was appointed by
President Clinton in 1995 and became the second woman on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.97 Judge Wood has focused on the importance of individual rights in many of her
Seventh Circuit opinions.98
Judge Wood’s ideas on constitutional interpretation and her opinions supporting
individual rights would have placed her “firmly on the left in the Court.”99 Further, the
more liberal justices have generally agreed with Judge Wood’s views, and her opinions
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have “generally fared well before the court as a whole.”100 Judge Wood has been called
“an articulate proponent for a dynamic Constitution.”101 Judge Wood is well known for her
lecture on her understanding of constitutional interpretation.102 In her lecture, Judge Wood
thoroughly explained her argument that the Framers of the Constitution enshrined “only
the broadest principles in the Constitution.” 103 An excerpt from Judge Wood’s lecture
reads:
First and most important is the idea that we should take seriously the fact
that the text of the Constitution tends to reflect broad principles, not specific
prescriptions. Neither James Madison, for whom this lecture is named, nor
any of the other Framers of the Constitution, were oblivious, careless, or
otherwise unaware of the words they chose for the document and its Bill of
Rights. The papers they left behind leave no doubt that they hoped to be
writing for the ages. There is no more reason to think that they expected
the world to remain static than there is to think that any of us holds a crystal
ball. The only way to create a foundational document that could stand the
test of time was to build enough flexibility that later generations would be
able to adapt to their own needs and uses.104
Judge Wood’s willingness to reconcile the NLRA and the FAA in her Seventh
Circuit Lewis decision likely flows naturally from her strong beliefs in the ever-growing
and ever-changing dynamics of the law. Judge Wood creates practical, logical analyses to
support her arguments, and is not afraid to stand up for her views against the “conservative
jurisprudence of the right.”105
Judge Wood was even considered by President Obama as a possible Supreme Court
nominee in 2010.106 Although President Obama did not appoint Judge Wood in the end,
the President sought “an intellectual counterweight” to Chief Justice Roberts, but who also
possessed “the same consensus-building skills” as Justice Stevens, such skills that could
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potentially tip a 5-4 court toward more liberal outcomes.107 President Obama saw potential
in Judge Wood, largely as a result of her time with Judges Easterbrook and Posner on the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 108 Judge Posner has been quoted as stating, “I think
[Judge Wood has] been very tactful in dealing with people – not giving up her views but
trying to look for common ground.”109 This “common ground” approach taken by Judge
Wood is clearly illustrated in her Lewis decision, and reflects a practical approach to
resolving the problem of class action waivers found in adhesive arbitration agreements.
D. The Morris Decision and Reasoning
Just a few months later, in August of 2016, the Ninth Circuit published an opinion
agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, and deepening the circuit split.110 In Morris v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that an employer violated
the NLRA by requiring employees to sign a concerted action waiver as a condition of
employment because preventing concerted work-related legal claims interfered with the
exercise of the employees’ right to act in concert under NLRA Section 7. 111 Two
employees working for the accounting firm Ernst & Young brought an action against their
employer. 112 As a condition of employment, the employees were required to sign
agreements not to join with other employees in bringing legal claims against the
company.113 The “concerted action waiver” required employees to (1) pursue any legal
claims against the company exclusively through arbitration; and (2) arbitrate only as
individuals and in “separate proceedings.” 114 In effect, the “concerted action waiver”
prevented employees from initiating concerted legal claims against Ernst & Young in any
forum, including in court, or in arbitration proceedings.115
The Ninth Circuit first established important employee rights that were to be
binding on the court’s decision.116 The Ninth Circuit stated “employees have the right to
107
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pursue work-related legal claims together,” 117 and further, that the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the “considerable deference” owed to the Board’s interpretations of the
NLRA.118 Next, the Ninth Circuit accepted the Board’s interpretation of Section 7 and
Section 8 of the NLRA.119 Similar to the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
reconciled the FAA with the NLRA, concluding the FAA did not reach a contrary result.120
The Ninth Circuit framed the issue in favor of the liberal federal policy in favor of
arbitration, because the problem with the contract was the waiver of a substantive federal
right, and not the requirement of arbitration.121
In line with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit established the
right to concerted action under Section 7 of the NLRA as a “substantive” right. 122 The
Ninth Circuit also refused to allow the NLRA and the FAA to “trump” the other.123 Instead,
the Ninth Circuit determined that when an arbitration contract waives a substantive federal
right, “the saving clause of the FAA prevents the enforcement of that waiver.”124
The Ninth Circuit provided a brief analysis of why “[t]he interaction between the
NLRA and the FAA makes this case distinct from other FAA enforcement challenges in at
least three additional and important ways.”125 First, the Ninth Circuit stated the terms of
the contract were accurately described as “illegal” because the employment contract
waived a federal substantive right.126 Second, the enforcement defense in the issue at hand
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Id. at 988 (noting that “the NLRA is unambiguous: concerted activity is the touchstone, and a ban on the
pursuit of concerted work-related legal claims interferes with a core, substantive right.”).
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had nothing to do with the adequacy of the arbitration proceedings. 127 Third, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the “enforcement” defense did not “disfavor” arbitration.128 The Ninth
Circuit concluded its reasoning with nothing short of a blow to the FAA, stating, “Further,
nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration case law suggests that a party may simply
incant the acronym “FAA” and receive protection for illegal contract terms anytime the
party suggests it will enjoy arbitration less without those illegal terms.” 129 The Ninth
Circuit emphasized that parties invoking the FAA cannot exploit the strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration to usurp the legal system.130
The majority’s decision was followed by a strong dissent by Judge Sandra Segal
Ikuta, reflecting the strong liberal policy in favor or arbitration.131 Judge Ikuta stated:
Today the majority holds that § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) precludes employees from waiving the right to arbitrate their
disputes collectively, thus striking at the heart of the Federal Arbitration
Act’s (FAA) command to enforce arbitration agreements according to their
terms. This decision is breathtaking in its scope and in its error; it is directly
contrary to Supreme Court precedent and joins the wrong side of a circuit
split.132
Judge Ikuta’s dissent illustrates the strong ideological differences among judges faced with
the issue of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. These ideological differences
are also present on the U.S. Supreme Court, and therefore, the Lewis decision will be
resolved in some capacity by a deeply divided bench in the October 2017 Term.133
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V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEWIS AND MORRIS DECISIONS
A. Lewis and Class Action Waivers

The Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions are the only circuits thus far to agree with
the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA as precluding class action waivers. The Seventh
Circuit, similar to the Board, attempted to reconcile the FAA and NLRA.134 The Michael
Cuda and Lewis decisions attempted to justify their progressive holdings by placing
important limits on the rights of employees to engage in class actions. The Board
emphasized the limits of its holding, noting that only a small percentage of arbitration
agreements would be potentially affected.135 The Seventh Circuit also justified its decision
by recognizing that the NLRA was “pro-arbitration.”136
Both decisions recognized that invalidating class action waivers would likely
receive scrutiny under the current federal policy in favor of arbitration.137 The Board and
the Seventh Circuit, by reconciling the FAA and the NLRA, engaged in an analysis that
the U.S. Supreme Court, and several other circuit courts, have refused to engage in. The
NLRA’s strong federal policy equalizing the bargaining rights between employers and
employees cannot be ignored in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness to impose
class action waivers found within adhesive arbitration agreements.138 The Lewis decision
engaged in a thorough, substantive analysis to reach its conclusion, unlike the other
circuits, which so quickly emphasized the superiority of the FAA.139
The Lewis decision provides a sound legal analysis for the U.S. Supreme Court to
consider. The validity of class action waivers in the employment context carries heavy
weight, as collective action for employees may be the only avenue to ensure equal
bargaining power against employers who attempt to insulate their business from these
remedies that, according to the Seventh Circuit, are guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA
and can be reconciled with the FAA.140 The Morris decision, decided within months of
134
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Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2288 (noting (1) only agreements applicable to “employees” as defined
in the NLRA even potentially implicate Section 7 rights; (2) the employment-related contracts of those
transportation workers covered by the Act appear already to be exempted by the FAA through Section 1 of
the statute, and (3) only those agreements that would be reasonably read to bar protected, concerted activity
are vulnerable).
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the Lewis decision, deepened the circuit split and further established that the U.S. Supreme
Court will need to address the issue of class action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements.
B. Deference Owed to the National Labor Relations Board
At the core of the Morris decision in particular, Chief Judge Sidney R. Thomas
placed a heavy emphasis on the deference courts owe to the National Labor Relations
Board. 141 Chief Judge Thomas, in his Ninth Circuit opinion, began his analysis by
recognizing the importance of the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA, while weighing the
balancing act that has developed between the judicial system and federal agencies of the
United States.142 Chief Judge Thomas stated that “[C]onsiderable deference” is owed to
the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA, and that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis would begin
with the Board’s “treatment of similar contract terms.”143 Chief Judge Thomas established
the Board’s conclusion that an employer violates the NLRA when “[I]t requires employees
covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an agreement that precludes
them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other
working conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.144 Chief Judge
Thomas next introduced the concept of “Chevron” deference to the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion.145 Under the theory of “Chevron deference,” a court cannot substitute its own
construction “of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”146
The issue relevant to this article is the tension between the National Labor Relations
Board (an administrative agency of the United States established by the National Labor
Relations Act) and the Supreme Court of the United States. The NLRA established that
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Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Construction and Application of “Chevron Deference” to Administrative
Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. FED. 2d 25, 1 (2005) (stating, “[I]f the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
146

employees have the right to “concerted action,” 147 but whether “concerted action” is
required as an arbitral remedy is not clear. The Chevron decision greatly increased the
legitimacy and power of federal administrative agencies, where the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the EPA’s definition of the term “source” was a permissible construction of the
Clean Air Act, which sought to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with
economic growth.148 The U.S. Supreme Court established the standard for when courts
could interfere with statutory interpretation and where such interference would be beyond
the scope of the Supreme Court’s authority.149 Setting forth the standard, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.150
Essentially, courts engage in a two-step analysis under Chevron, looking to
whether (1) Congress spoken directly to the precise question at issue; and (2) if not, whether
the agency’s construction of the statute reasonable.151 Justice Stevens also states several
important policy arguments for why administrative agencies are owed deference. For
example, Justice Stevens stated that (1) judges are not experts in the field, unlike agencies;
(2) the executive branch of government should be making policy choices, and not judges;
and (3) judges have a duty to respect policy choices of executive branch agencies because
they are ultimately accountable to the people.152 Justice Stevens’ strong policy argument
represented the U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness to yield to the expertise of administrative
agencies that administered statutes in “light of everyday realities.”153 Because the issue of
147
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class action waivers in employment agreements will reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Court should recognize the Chevron deference principle.154 If the Court gives deference
to the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA, then the Court will have to invalidate class
action waivers in employment agreements because such waivers violate employees’
statutory right to “concerted activity” under the NLRA.155
Chief Judge Thomas applied the Chevron principles to the issue in Morris.156 Chief
Judge Thomas emphasized, “In this case, we need go no further. The intent of Congress is
clear from the statute and is consistent with the Board’s interpretation.” 157 Chief Judge
Thomas began with the plain language of the NLRA and precedential cases to determine
that the NLRA established the rights of employees to pursue work related claims
together.158 Chief Judge Thomas also recognized the importance of Section 8 of the NLRA,
which enforces Section 7 and “has long been held to prevent employers from
circumventing the NLRA’s protection for concerted activity by requiring employees to
agree to individual activity in its place.”159 Chief Judge Thomas then referenced the very
clause at issue.160 The “separate proceedings” clause did not allow employees to pursue
work-related claims individually, and further, employees were legally bound by the
result.161 Chief Judge Thomas determined that “[t]his restriction is the ‘very antithesis’ of
§ 7’s substantive right to pursue concerted work-related legal claims.”162 Concluding his
Chevron deference analysis, Chief Judge Thomas recognized the Board’s accurate
interpretation of Section 7 and Section 8 of the NLRA. 163 Chief Judge Thomas did not
proceed to the second step of Chevron analysis because under his impression, the NLRA
was “unambiguous.”164
Applied together, the Seventh Circuit’s Lewis decision and the Ninth Circuit’s
Morris decision applied reasoning that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot ignore. The Seventh
Circuit’s reconciliation between the FAA and NLRA, combined with the Ninth Circuit’s
154
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Chevron deference analysis, represent the tension between two federal statutes as well as
the tension between the judicial system and administrative agencies. The U.S. Supreme
Court will soon resolve the issue of class action waivers in the employment context in the
October 2017 Term, and the Court will likely have to address these important power
struggles recognized by the Lewis and Morris decisions.165
C. Is Class Arbitration Realistic Procedurally?
Taking a brief step away from the legal analysis, the ability of arbitration
procedures to handle “class arbitration” will be an issue that the U.S. Supreme Court will
need to address for the first time since Concepcion.166 In the Concepcion decision, the late
Justice Scalia addressed what he believed to be structural issues surrounding class-wide
arbitration.167 Justice Scalia stated:
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and
different procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes
more difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator
with some expertise relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators
are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects
of certification, such as the protection of absent parties.168
Justice Scalia also believed the switch from “bilateral” to multilateral arbitration
would sacrifice the “informality” of arbitration and thereby increase costs, time, and
procedural delay.169 Justice Scalia cited the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)
statistics and recognized the AAA’s class arbitration procedures. 170 Justice Scalia
emphasized that “not a single” class arbitration had resulted in a final award on the merits,
and further, that the average time from filing to settlement, withdrawal, or dismissal, was
630 days for class arbitrations.171
Justice Scalia continued his analysis with reference to the AAA rules governing
class arbitrations, and recognized that the rules “mimic[ed]” the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure for class litigation.172 Justice Scalia noted concern for absent class members who
would not be bound by the arbitration, because of the ability of parties to alter class
arbitration procedures by contract. 173 Justice Scalia also recognized the potential for
arbitrator errors that may go uncorrected because of the “absence of multilayered review”
in arbitration procedures.174 Justice Scalia concluded his grievances with class arbitration
procedures by stating that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class
litigation.”175 Justice Scalia supported his proposition by recognizing the minimal authority
of the courts to vacate an arbitral award, as well as the inability of parties to expand the
grounds or nature of judicial review.176
While several of Justice Scalia’s arguments in Concepcion do raise practical
concerns, a look into the AAA’s “Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations” and a
glimpse at more recent statistics suggest that class-wide arbitration may not be completely
out of reach for consumers and employees who would benefit from the aggregation of
claims. 177 In a 2015 article titled Have Class Arbitrations Found New Life? (“NYLJ
Article”), the authors suggested that “in spite of [that] critique and the widespread use of
clauses in which the parties waive any right to arbitration on a class basis, class arbitrations
continue to be filed and result in decisions.”178 The NYLJ Article also referenced the same
AAA brief mentioned in Justice Scalia’s Concepcion majority opinion. 179 The AAA
recognizes, that at the time of submittal, out of 283 separate class arbitrations filed, no class
arbitrations have resulted in a final award on the merits.180 However, since the submittal of
172
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Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350 (noting, “[W]hen damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential
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AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPP. RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (effective Oct. 8, 2003), available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/ad
rstg_004129.pdf [hereinafter AAA].
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the AAA’s brief and the Concepcion decision, there have been class arbitrations that
proceeded to merit awards.181
For example, the NYLJ Article cited two recent cases to support the proposition
that class arbitrations may be feasible components to class litigation. First, the NYLJ
Article cited a Fourth Circuit case that confirmed a class arbitration award in favor of
487,066 consumers using “credit repair” services.182 The NYLJ Article noted that some
defendants entered into class-wide settlements “that resulted in an arbitral award of $2.6
million in attorney fees to counsel for claimants.” 183 The second case involves a class
certification of 44,000 current and former female employees at retail jewelry stores who
challenged pay and promotion practices carried out by their employers. 184 The NYLJ
Article also recognized that “[t]here has been no record of widespread complaints of
procedural irregularities or unfairness in such cases, and class arbitrations can result in
settlements administered much as class settlements in courts would be and in merits
awards.”185
The “Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations” also represent sophisticated and
thorough guidelines for those who wish to engage in class-wide arbitration. 186 For
example, similar to the rules governing class litigation, a class may be certified for class
arbitration only if each of the following six conditions are met:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf
of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class;
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class;
(5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class; and
(6) each class member has entered into an agreement containing an
arbitration clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the
class representative(s) and each of the other class members.187
181
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Thus, with recent successful attempts at class-wide arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court
will have to recognize the developments that have been made since the Concepcion
decision now that Lewis has been granted certiorari.
As illustrated by the factors above, the AAA requires several considerations by an
arbitrator before a class can be certified. Further, under the “Confidentiality” section of
the Supplemental Rules, the AAA states that “The presumption of privacy and
confidentiality in arbitration proceedings shall not apply in class arbitrations. All class
arbitration hearings and filings may be made public, subject to the authority of the arbitrator
to provide otherwise in special circumstances.”188 The AAA also maintains a docket of
arbitrations filed as class arbitrations on the AAA website. 189 Finally, the AAA requires
any award rendered under the Supplementary Rules to be in writing, with reasoning, and
signed by the arbitrator or majority of arbitrators.190 A preliminary filing fee alone amounts
to $3,350 for a party seeking class arbitration.191 The significant costs of entering into
arbitration illustrate why aggregating smaller claims in the hopes of achieving larger
settlements may be attractive to parties with common questions of law or fact.
The AAA rules are an example of one vehicle that provides for class arbitration
procedures. There is no denying that a very small number of class arbitration procedures
have reached an award on the merits.192 However, class-wide arbitration procedures do
exist, and provide a tool for consumers and employees to aggregate claims that will likely
not be worth arbitrating alone.193 Thus, adhesive arbitration provisions found in consumer
and employee contracts deny these individuals the right to engage in class action litigation
or class-wide arbitration if they so choose.
VI.

LOOKING FORWARD: THE FATE OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
A. Push-Back by Consumers after Concepcion

Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s message in Concepcion validated class action
waivers in consumer agreements, consumer advocates have pushed back in favor of
protecting the rights of consumers. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)
proposed the prohibition of mandatory arbitration clauses that deny groups of consumers
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their day in court. 194 In a press release from the CFPB, the statement recognized that
“widely used [adhesive arbitration] clauses” leave consumers with no choice but to seek
individual relief.195
The CFPB recognized the wide reach of these mandatory arbitration clauses,
bringing to light the “hundreds of million of consumer contracts” affected by this business
practice.196 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act,197 in conjunction with the Consumer
Protection Act198 (“CPA”), required the CFPB to study the use of mandatory arbitration
clauses in consumer financial markets.199 Congress also gave the CFPB the power to issue
regulations that are in the public interest, for the protection of consumers, and consistent
with the study.200
The CFPB’s study, released in March 2015, found that “Consumers are generally
unaware of whether their credit card contracts include arbitration clauses.”201 The study
found that class actions provided a more effective means for consumers to challenge the
practices used by companies in the business of credit cards or bank accounts. 202 The
CFBP’s proposal referenced potential remedies for consumers. 203 These remedies
included (1) prohibiting companies from placing mandatory arbitration clauses in new
contracts that prevent class action lawsuits; and (2) requiring companies with arbitration
clauses to submit CFPB claims, awards, and certain related materials that are filed in
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arbitration cases. 204 The CFPB press release recognized three benefits of the proposal,
including (1) a day in court for consumers; (2) a deterrent effect [for companies placing
these provisions in contracts]; and (3) increased transparency.205 The CFPB’s proposed
rule has not yet become final, and the CFPB is currently in the process of reviewing public
comments.206 If the proposed rule becomes final, the CFPB’s efforts will represent a major
victory for consumers and a major blow to consumer product and service providers. This
is because the proposed rule represents an effort to chip away at the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Concepcion decision, which left consumers at the mercy of adhesive arbitration provisions.
B. Granted Certiorari: The Issue Before the Supreme Court
On January 13, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Epic Systems’ petition for a
writ of certiorari.207 The U.S. Supreme Court ordered that Lewis be consolidated with the
Ninth Circuit’s Morris decision and the Fifth Circuit’s Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808
F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) decision.208 The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court is “whether
an agreement that requires an employer and an employee to resolve employment-related
disputes through individual arbitration, and waive class and collective proceedings, is
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act.”209 The issue of class action waivers in employment disputes
will likely be resolved along the lines of political ideology, similar to the Concepcion
decision, 210 which illustrated the sharp ideological divide between Supreme Court
Justices.211 With the nomination and appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch by President
Trump,212 the likelihood of a decision coming down against class action waivers is slim.
The Murphy Oil decision appeared before the Fifth Circuit after the National Labor
Relations Board concluded that Murphy Oil USA, Inc. had “unlawfully required employees
at its Alabama facility to sign an arbitration agreement waiving their right to pursue class
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and collective actions.”213 Author of the opinion Judge Leslie H. Southwick noted that
Murphy Oil strategically used “broad venue rights” to file its petition with the Fifth Circuit
knowing that the circuit would rule in its favor, against the Board. 214 The aggrieved
employees in Murphy Oil argued that the binding arbitration agreement they signed
interfered with their rights under NLRA’s Section 7 to engage in concerted activity.215
Judge Southwick’s opinion did not fail to emphasize the Board’s refusal to follow the Fifth
Circuit’s D.R. Horton II decision.216 Judge Southwick also made clear that the Fifth Circuit
was not going to repeat its analysis from D.R. Horton II.217 Judge Southwick once again
emphasized the Board’s disregard of D.R. Horton II and stated “Our decision was issued
not quite two years ago; we will not repeat its analysis here. Murphy Oil committed no
unfair labor practice by requiring employees to relinquish their right to pursue class or
collective claims in all forums by signing the arbitration agreements at issue here.”218 The
Fifth Circuit did note, however, that in the Board’s favor, the Board may “well not know”
which circuit’s law would be applied on a petition for review.219 Judge Southwick further
stated, “We do not celebrate the Board’s failure to follow our D.R. Horton [II] reasoning,
but neither do we condemn its nonacquiescence.” 220 The Murphy Oil decision be
consolidated with Lewis and Morris, and the conflict between the FAA and the NLRA will
be decided at some capacity in the October 2017 Term.
Epic Systems Corporation’s “Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” (“Petition”) and
Jacob Lewis’ “Brief for the Respondent in Opposition” (“Opposition”) presented two
persuasive and significantly differing takes on the issue to be presented before the U.S.
Supreme Court, and are worth mentioning in some detail.221 The Petition framed the issue
213
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Id. (stating, “The Board, also aware, moved for en banc review in order to allow arguments that the prior
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our initial D.R. Horton decision and six months after rehearing was denied. The Board, unpersuaded by our
analysis, reaffirmed its D.R. Horton decision.”).
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around the “contrary congressional command” exception to the FAA, and argued that
NLRA’s Section 7 did not possess such command as to override the FAA.222 Further, the
Petition framed the circuit split much differently than the Opposition. 223 The Petition
stated:
The courts are squarely divided over this important and recurring question.
Three federal courts of appeals (the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits) and
two state courts of last resort (the California and Nevada Supreme Courts)
have concluded that the answer is no: agreements to submit employment
disputes to individual arbitration are fully enforceable. Two other federal
courts of appeals (the Seventh and Ninth Circuits)—as well as the National
Labor Relations Board—have concluded that the answer is yes: these
agreements are unenforceable because they bar class and collective
proceedings.224
The Petition asked the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve and acknowledge the split.225
In addition, the Petition described the Fifth Circuit as “squarely and repeatedly” upholding
class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements.226 The Petition described the
Eighth Circuit as concluding that employment arbitration agreements containing class
action waivers were enforceable under the FAA, “notwithstanding federal labor laws or the
NLRB’s interpretation of those laws,”227 and the Second Circuit as agreeing with the Fifth
and the Eighth Circuits.228 The circuit split was characterized as “fully developed” and
“ripe for resolution” by the U.S. Supreme Court.229
The Petition continued by discussing the conflict between the NLRA and the FAA,
and immediately noted that “[f]ederal statutes are not all on equal footing when it comes
to arbitration agreements.”230 The Petition also cited CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) as authority for the notion that the FAA is the proper statute
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governing arbitration provisions, even when other federal statutes are involved. 231 The
Petition also cited the argument previously referenced in Concepcion, that the FAA
envisioned “bilateral” and not “multilateral” arbitration. 232 The Petition criticized the
Seventh Circuit’s failure to address whether the NLRA presented a “contrary congressional
command,” and called the Seventh Circuit’s analysis “flawed from start to finish.” 233
Finally, the Petition concluded its argument by citing policy reasons driving the resolution
of the circuit split. 234 The Petition noted the uncertainty faced by both employers and
employees because of the unresolved issue of class action waivers in employment
agreements.235 The Petition also highlighted the “range” of companies affected by the split
of authority.236 The Petition stated, “Absent action by this Court, the courts will continue
to face repeat litigation on this question.”237
In response, the Opposition framed the issue under the question that will ultimately
be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.238 The Opposition asked the U.S. Supreme Court
to decide whether the FAA’s savings clause bars enforcement of class action waivers that
violate NLRA Section 7.239 Further, the Opposition immediately criticized the Petition’s
argument by stating that the Petition:
(1) mischaracterizes and exaggerates any split, (2) fails to address the merits
of the issue the courts below actually did consider, (3) spins as “important
and recurring,” [Pet. 4], an issue missing from the case, and (4) ignores
231

Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 221, at 14 (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665
(2012)).
232

Id.
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arbitration, and certainly not a right that trumps the FAA’s presumption that arbitration agreements are
enforceable as written.”).
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operations span multiple circuits.”).
235

Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 221, at 20-21 (referencing: “Epic (health software), D.R. Horton (home
construction), Murphy (convenience stores), Bristol Care (residential care services), Cellular Sales of
Missouri (telecommunications retail), Ernst & Young (professional services), Bloomingdale’s (department
stores), CLS Transportation (trucking), and CPS Security (security services; in Tallman, the Nevada Supreme
Court case.”).
236

237

Id. at 23.

238

Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Lewis, (No. 16-285).

239

Brief for the Opposition, supra note 221, at 8.

several defects that make this case a poor vehicle to review the question it
might actually present, let alone one it does not.240
The Opposition argued that the proper question before the U.S. Supreme Court should have
been “(1) whether the NLRA makes collective-action waivers illegal and (2) if so, whether
the FAA’s savings clause nonetheless requires their enforcement.” 241 In addition, the
Opposition argued that only three circuits had analyzed the saving clause question.”242
Next, the Opposition distinguished the Eighth Circuit and Second Circuit cases because
the courts analyzed whether the FLSA constituted a “contrary congressional command,”
and did not discuss the conflict between the FAA and the NLRA.243 The Opposition stated
that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits “have identified the proper issue,” and therefore, the
issue should be resolved in the lower courts before U.S. Supreme Court intervention.244
The Opposition argued that the plain language and purpose of the NLRA, combined
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s and the Board’s interpretations of Section 7, support the
conclusion that the NLRA grants employees a substantive right to pursue claims
collectively.245 The Opposition also established that “concerted activities” clearly included
“collective legal action.”246 The Opposition also referenced the Chevron deference owed
to the Board because Congress here has “unambiguously spoken to the precise question at
issue.”247 Finally, the Opposition rounded out its substantive argument by citing Section 8
of the NLRA, which sets forth the principle that any contractual provisions conflicting with
Section 7 of the NLRA are unlawful.248 The Opposition agreed with the decision by Judge
Wood from the Seventh Circuit and used similar reconciliation language by stating,
“Foreseeing potential conflicts between the FAA and other statutes, Congress included a
saving clause…” to ensure than any arbitration provisions violating another federal statute
would not be enforced.249
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The Opposition even addressed Concepcion and Italian Colors, and suggested
these holdings from the U.S. Supreme Court did not suggest in any manner that the FAA
required the enforcement of an arbitration provision found to have violated a federal
statute.250 The Opposition also attacked the Petition’s reliance on CompuCredit because
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in that case only answered the narrow question of
whether the Credit Repair Organization Act (“CROA”) represented a “contrary
congressional command” to foreclose arbitration.251 To conclude its brief, the Opposition
asked the U.S. Supreme Court to acknowledge that Murphy Oil would be “the most
appropriate vehicle” for the Supreme Court to review because the Board is a full party in
that case.252 The Opposition’s issue presented will go before the U.S. Supreme Court.253
For the first time since Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court will weigh in on the validity
of class action waivers found within adhesive arbitration provisions. While the issue
presented involves the fate of employees, and not consumers, the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court will likely put to rest the validity of class action waivers once and for all.
The Lewis and Morris opinions provide powerful analyses for the U.S. Supreme Court to
consider when deciding on the fate of class action waivers in employment agreements. The
major arguments set forth include the potential reconciliation of the FAA and the NLRA,
and deference owed to the Board’s interpretation of NLRA Section 7. The Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Murphy Oil provides the opposite side of the argument for why class action
waivers should be valid.254 Despite the split of authority, there exists an undeniable policy
argument that uncertainty among courts has led to a significant amount of uncertainty for
employers and employees.255 The Petition noted that, “employers located in the Second,
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits will continue to be subjected to NLRB enforcement actions
against their use of class waivers. And when the NLRB inevitably finds that the waivers
are unenforceable, the employers must go through the hassle of filing a petition for review,
even though the issue has been decided squarely in their favor in those circuits.”256

under the NLRA, moreover, hardly disfavors arbitration. A contract forbidden collective action in court
(without mentioning arbitration) would be equally invalid.”).
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Id. at 23 (highlighting the NLRA’s “judicial-review provision,” which allows those aggrieved by Board
decisions to seek review in the circuit where the unfair labor practice occurred, the circuit where the person
resides or transacts business, or the D.C. Circuit).
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C. The Current Legal Landscape of the U.S. Supreme Court
The timing of the Lewis decision may be potentially groundbreaking for the issue
of class action waivers in adhesive arbitration agreements. The issue of adhesive
arbitration, and more specifically of class action waivers, is one of political ideology. This
is illustrated by the Concepcion decision, written by Justice Scalia.257 His opinion was
followed by a strong dissent from Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and
Justice Kagan. 258 President Trump nominated Judge Neil Gorsuch, who was recently
appointed as the ninth Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. 259 Justice Gorsuch was
previously appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by
President George W. Bush in 2006.260 Justice Gorsuch was a confidant of the late Justice
Scalia, and is known to share “Justice Scalia’s legal philosophy, talent for vivid writing
and love of outdoors.”261 Justice Gorsuch “also seems to have a set of judicial/ideological
commitments apart from his personal policy preferences that drive his decisionmaking.”262 As a “textualist,” Justice Gorsuch’s opinion on the Chevron doctrine may be
of particular importance if the U.S. Supreme Court nominee participates in the Lewis
decision.263 Justice Scalia’s take on administrative law involved granting more power to
administrative agencies and limiting the role of the courts in reviewing the interpretation
of federal statutes by administrative agencies. 264 The Lewis, Morris, and Murphy Oil
decisions all have roots in the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA. Justice Gorsuch’s view
on administrative law involves less deference to administrative agencies and more
deference to courts.265 Therefore, the accuracy of the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA
257

See generally Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336-52.

258

See id. at 357-66.

Mark Walsh, A “View” From the Rose Garden: Neil Gorsuch Takes the Judicial Oath, SCOTUSBLOG
(Apr. 10, 2017, 4:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/04/view-rose-garden-neil-gorsuch-takesjudicial-oath/.
259

260

Citron, supra note 212.

261

Adam Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, and Echo of Scalia in Philosophy and Style, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-nominee.html?_r=1.
262

Citron, supra note 212.

Id. (noting that Judge Gorsuch’s approach to the Chevron doctrine differ significantly from that of Justice
Scalia, because “Unlike Scalia, Gorsuch really does want to apply the basic Gorsuch/Scalia take on ordinary
statutes to administrative statutes as well. He believes even those broadly worded enforcement statutes have
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will likely be a relevant factor considered by Justice Gorsuch when he presides over the
case.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Now that the issue in Lewis will go before the U.S. Supreme Court, the validity of
class action waivers in employment agreements will be settled in the October 2017 Term.
Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s strong disfavor of class action litigation and
class-wide arbitration, the Lewis decision, Morris decision, and the Board’s interpretation
of the NLRA as precluding class action waivers represent a significant trend toward
recognizing the general unfairness of class action waivers in employment agreements. The
Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and the Board all recognize certain rights granted to
employees under the NLRA that cannot be stripped away by the strong federal policy in
favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. The CFPB’s proposed rules also respond to the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion and illustrate an effort protect consumers,
who have also fell victim to the validity of class action waivers present in adhesive
arbitration agreements.
Although procedures for class-wide arbitration do exist, there is no denying that
class arbitration is difficult to carry out. However, the right of employees to aggregate
claims in an effort to level the playing field against employers has long been established
by the NLRA, and the U.S. Supreme Court cannot merely disregard a federal statute just
because that statute potentially conflicts with the FAA. Opponents to the validation of
class action waivers have now let their voices be heard, and the U.S. Supreme Court will
have to balance the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration against the strong federal
policy protecting the rights of employees to pursue work-related claims collectively against
significantly more powerful employers.

